

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 108800

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR KLEIN USDEL REVCON

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION BONN, INFO NATO, LONDON, MBFR VIENNA,  
MAY 9, FROM SECSTATE RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 108800

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: FRG VIEWS ON OPTION III

REF: BONN 7330

GENEVA - FOR KLEIN USDEL REVCON

1. FRG EMBASSY COUNSELOR SCHAUER PRESENTED FRG PAPER CON-  
TAINING WORKING LEVEL COMMENTS ON US "NEXT STEPS" PAPER  
(SEE TEXT BELOW) TO PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR GOODBY AND ACDA  
OFFICERS ON MAY 7. SCHAUER EMPHASIZED THAT COMMENTS WERE  
QUITE GENERAL AND WERE AGREED AT THE WORKING LEVEL ONLY AND  
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THUS WERE NOT BINDING ON THE FRG. HE INDICATED THAT THEY

INTEND TO COMMENT FURTHER WHEN THE ISSUE IS RAISED IN NATO.  
AN AUTHORITATIVE GERMAN GOVERNMENT POSITION WILL BE TAKEN  
ONLY AFTER NATO CONSULTATIONS ARE COMPLETED.

2. WHEN QUESTIONED, SCHAUER STATED HE FELT THAT FRG IS  
WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE US WILL INTRODUCE  
OPTION III INTO NATO IN NEAR FUTURE. WHEN QUERIED REGARDING  
REASON UNDERLYING LACK OF AUTHORITATIVE FRG POSITION  
DESPITE UK INTENTION TO PROVIDE SUCH AUTHORITATIVE COMMENTS,  
SCHAUER INDICATED THAT HE FELT BOTH LACK OF TIME AND FRG  
DESIRE TO RESERVE ITS POSITION WERE RESPONSIBLE. HE

UNDERTOOK TO QUERY BONN SPECIFICALLY ON THIS QUESTION WITH  
A NOTATION BOTH THAT UK INTENDS TO PROVIDE AUTHORITATIVE  
COMMENTS AND THAT US TIMING FOR OPTION III INTRODUCTION  
INTO NATO MIGHT SLIP UNTIL AFTER NATO SUMMIT.

3. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL GERMAN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF  
PAPER. BEGIN TEXT:

WITH OPTION III, A QUALITATIVELY NEW ELEMENT IS BEING  
INTRODUCED INTO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE CONSEQUENCES  
HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED.

WE REALIZE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WANTS THE INTRODUCTION  
OF OPTION III FOR TACTICAL AND DOMESTIC REASONS. WE DO  
NOT INTEND TO BLOCK IT. AS IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WE  
SHALL ALSO IN NATO PARTICIPATE CRITICALLY BUT CONSTRUC-  
TIVELY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JOINT POSITION IN REGARD  
TO OPTION III.

IN PAST TALKS WE HAVE HELD THE POSITION THAT TO US THE  
INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS SEEMS RELATIVELY UNPROBLEM-  
ATIC BUT THAT WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS CONCERNING THE INCLUSION  
OF PERSHING AND ESPECIALLY AIRCRAFT. THESE DOUBTS STILL  
EXIST. THEREFORE WE HAVE TO INSIST ON THE FOLLOWING  
PRECONDITIONS:

--THE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING HAS TO BE  
INSISTED UPON, I.E., PREFERABLY TO A QUANTIFIED COMMON  
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CEILING.

THE REDUCED SYSTEMS OF OPTION III IN QUESTION MAY ONLY  
INCLUDE US SYSTEMS.

--INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III HAS TO BE A ONE-TIME ACTION,  
WHEREBY ONE HAS TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS ONLY VALID IN THE  
FIRST NEGOTIATING PHASE AND IN THE SECOND NEGOTIATING

PHASE WITH THE INCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE REPEATED.

--THE FOCUS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTIONS OF THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES AND ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING IN PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES MUST BE MAINTAINED.

--THE QUESTION OF REDEPLOYMENT OF THE WITHDRAWN SYSTEMS HAS TO BE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLARIFIED WITHIN NATO.

--ANALOGOUS EUROPEAN SYSTEMS HAVE TO BE KEPT OUT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SO THAT FUTURE STRUCTURAL

CHANGES AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. EVEN A LIMITATION OF THE EUROPEAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS FIXED IN TIME WOULD NOT DO JUSTICE TO OUR DOUBTS DUE TO THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE SECOND PHASE.

THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORDS CAN ONLY BE GUARANTEED THROUGH THE AGREED UPON CEILINGS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES PERSONNEL. LIMITATIONS OF EUROPEAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD INEVITABLY IMPAIR THE QUALITY OF EUROPEAN FLEXIBILITY.

--EUROPEAN OPTIONS MUST NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III.

WE ATTACH GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT THAT OPTION III IS INTRODUCED WITH MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE AND THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE UNDESIRED NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ARE ELIMINATED.

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THIS ALSO MEANS ESPECIALLY:

--THAT WITH OPTION III THE EFFORT IS MADE TO ACHIEVE THE BREAKTHROUGH TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONVENTIONAL PARITY (COMMON CEILING)

--THAT THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE WESTERN DEFENSE IN TOTAL IS MAINTAINED

--THAT THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON THE WESTERN SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION IS POSITIVELY ELIMINATED

--THAT ESPECIALLY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS (TANKS AND AIRCRAFT) ARE NOT AFFECTED IN THEIR DEVELOPMENTS AND

PRODUCTION POTENTIALS

--THAT THE DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY OF THE WEST IS MAINTAINED.

WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT THAT WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III WE WILL NOT BE FORCED INTO AN UNAVOIDABLE MOVE; I.E., THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III HAS TO BE CALCULATED AS IS DONE IN THE US PAPER WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"WHILE WE STRONGLY PREFER TO CONCLUDE A SUCCESSFUL MBFR AGREEMENT WITH THE PACT, WE BELIEVE THAT FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD DEGRADE THE MILITARY BALANCE OR SIGNIFICANTLY CONSTRAIN NATO'S ABILITY TO IMPROVE ITS POSITION UNILATERALLY."

WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO CLARIFICATION OF ALL SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF OPTION III IN NATO PRIOR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III IN VIENNA. THIS ALSO INCLUDES THE QUESTION IN WHICH WAY A LIMITATION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMS CAN BE CONSIDERED BY NATO. WE CONSIDER THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE DECISION ON THIS PROBLEM AS SUGGESTED IN THE US PAPER NOT ACCEPTABLE.

SINCE DURING THE LAST NEGOTIATION ROUND IN VIENNA IT HAS BECOME EVIDENT THAT THE EAST POSSIBLY IS WILLING TO START  
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A DATA DISCUSSION, THE DATE FOR AN INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY

--THE TERMINATION OF OPTION III CONSULTATIONS IN NATO

--BUT ALSO UPON THE CONTINUATION OF A POSSIBLE DATA DISCUSSION IN VIENNA.

WE ON OUR PART CONSIDER A SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN OPTION III AND DATA DISCUSSION AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE DATA DISCUSSION DESIRABLE.

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IMPORTANT TO US REMAIN OPEN AND WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED APPROPRIATELY:

A. NUCLEAR WARHEADS

--PROBLEMS OF MINIATURIZATION AND OF THE QUESTION WHETHER THE MARGIN GIVEN AT A FUTURE 1:1 REPLACEMENT IS SUFFICIENT

--POSITIVE EXCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS

--UNEQUIVOCAL PRESERVATION OF THE PREVIOUSLY USED METHODS  
OF NUCLEAR PARTICIPATION

--CLARIFICATION OF THE WP ARSENAL.

B. PERSHINGS

--PROBLEMS OF GENERAL LIMITATION OF SSMS RANGING OVER  
500 KM IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE CONVENTIONALIZATION OF  
CORRESPONDING WEAPONS SYSTEMS

--EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBILITY WHETHER PERSHING WHICH IS  
TO BE LIMITED COULD BE DEFINED AS GROUND-GROUND MISSILE IN  
A NUCLEAR ROLE

--IMPORTANCE OF THE CORRESPONDING SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS  
STATIONED IN THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS

--IMPORTANCE GIVEN BY WP TO MISSILE DEVELOPMENT.

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C. AIRCRAFT

--PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

--PREVENTION OF NEGATIVE EFFECT ON EUROPEAN SYSTEMS

--AVOIDANCE OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON FUTURE DEVELOP-  
MENTS (E.G. MRCA).

D. WESTERN TANKS

1.--CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSPICUOUS DISPARITIES BETWEEN  
EAST AND WEST

--NECESSITY TO AVOID QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS FOR  
EUROPEAN SYSTEMS

--PREVENTION OF UNDESIRABLE NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREE-  
MENTS FOR ANTI-TANK WEAPONS.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE TANK PROBLEMS DUE TO THE  
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES WE WOULD STILL PREFER TO FOREGO A  
NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF THE TANKS ALSO FOR US AND THEREFORE  
NATURALLY ALSO FOR SOVIET TANKS AND TO GUARANTEE THE TANK  
LIMITATION FOR EUROPEAN AND US TANKS THROUGH THE AGREED  
CEILINGS FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. END TEXT. KISSINGER  
UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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